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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 7176 
HOWARD S. BYINGTON, 
Defendent and appellant. 
Brief of· Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Howard S. Byington, having been 
tried before the District Court of the First Judicial Dis-
trict in and for the County of Cache, State of Utah, was 
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found guilty by verdict of the jury of Perjury in the 
Second Degree and sentenced therefor by imprisonment 
in the Cache County jail, Logan, Utah, for a term of one 
year. It is from the verdict and sentence that he appeals. 
The record discloses, by State's exhibit "C", that 
a Decree of Divorce was entered on the 9th day of May 
1947, dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between 
one Howard S. Byington the Appellant and one Lavina 
Byington ; and that by the provisions of the Decree Mrs. 
Byington was awarded custody of the four children of the j 1 
parties and $50.00 per month for their support and main-
tenance, payable on the 20th day of May 1947 and each 
month thereafter. A further sum of $1.00 per year was 
awarded to Lavina Byington as alimony, payable June 
1, 1947 and annually thereafter. 
State's exhibit '' C'' further reflects that on or about 
the 26th of November 1947, Lavina Byington filed an 
Affidavit in which she set forth as a fact the failure of 
the Appellant to make the payments as ordered and fur-
ther that ''His failure to pay said sums has been willful 
and intentional.'' Lavina Byington, in the aforesaid af-
fidavit, prayed that the Court enter an order directing 
the Appellant to show cause why he should not be punish-
ed for contempt for failure to make aforesaid payments. 
The order was issued by the Court on or about the 26th 
day of November 1947 and was regularly heard by the 
Court on the 8th day of December. At the hearing Lavina 
Byington appeared personally and was represented by 
her counsel. The Appellant appeared without counsel. 
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The Court heard the testimony of Lavina Byington as 
to her information concerning the Appellant's inconw 
since the making of the Decree and also the Appellant 
was questioned at that time by counsel for Mrs. Bying-
ton and by the Court in respect to his earnings and fail-
ure to pay alimony. 
It was during the course of these proceedings on 
the Order to Show Cause that the Appellant, among other 
things, was questioned as to whether or not he had re-
married and the Appellant answered "yes". He further 
testified that he was married in the state of Montana 
but that he did not know of the exact time or place. His 
recollection concerning the marriage was so hazy that 
the Court asked: 
''Where is your wife~'' 
Answer: ''Home.'' 
Court: ''Hasn't she been able to tell you 
where you got married~'' 
Answer: ''Well, I guess she could.'' 
Court: ''Then I'm going to give you just 
about five minutes to get down there, Mr. Bying-
ton, and bring her back here. We'll take a recess 
for about ten minuteS' so far as this case is con-
cerned, and you may go with the Sheriff and bring 
her back.'' 
(Page 56, State's Exhibit "B ") 
The Appellant returned a few minutes later and was 
again questioned regarding his marriage and he again 
testified that he was married and that he did not know 
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the time or place but that the marriage was entered into 
in the state of Montana. (Pages 56 and 57, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "B"). 
It was upon this testimony concerning marriage 
following the Decree of his divorce from Lavina Bying-
ton that the Appellant was charged and convicted of the 
crime of Perjury in the Second Degree. 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
QUESTIONS !CONCERNING MARRIAGE WERE PROPER 
AND PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
Counsel for Appellant, in his brief, argues that the 
question of whether or not the Appellant was married 
was collateral and incidental as far as the issues in the 
proceedings were involved, had nothing whatsoever to 
do with Byington's default in alimony payments, and 
no materiality in the determination as to whether or not 
the Appellant should he punished for contempt. 
It may be conceded that this argument is correct, 
as far as the premises therein are involved; however, it 
is the position of the Respondent that the information 
would be pertinent to the Court in the final determin-
ation as to the disposition to be made of the matter before 
him. That is to say the Court, with the decree standing of 
record and the failure of the Appellant to obey the de-
cree, may have no alternative but to find that the Decree 
had been vi<;>lated and, following questions concerning the 
activities of the Appellant, determine the Appellant to 
be in contempt. Nevertheless the court had an additional 
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determination to make and that is to the extent of the 
punishment to be meted in accordance with the facts and 
circumstances. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
marital status of the Appellant would be pertinent and 
that the Court was justified in going into the domestic 
situation of Byington as 'Yell as his economic condition. 
This proposition js well supported under the law. See 
Hillyard Ys. District Court of Cache County 68 Utah 
220, 249 Pac. 806 and ""\Yatson vs. Watson, 72 Utah 218, 
269 Pac. 775. In the Watson Case this Court held: 
"(1) The particular question here, however, 
arises upon the contention of defendant that the 
finding made by the court does not warrant or 
support the judgment of imprisonment which 
was entered against him. It is argued that a find-
ing of present ability to comply with an order is 
an essential prerequisite to an order that the de-
linquent be imprisoned until he does comply. In 
support thereof the following cases are cited: Ex 
parte Silvia, 123 Cal. 293, 55 P. 988, 69 Am. St., 
Rep. 58; In re Cowder, 139 Cal. 244, 73 P. 
156; Lutz vs. District Court, 29 Nev. 152, 86 P. 
445; Ex parte Hamberg, 37 Idaho, 550, 217 P. 
264--to which may be added our own decision in 
Hillyard vs. District Court (Utah) 249 P. 806. 
The judgments considered in the cited cases 
were all coercive in form and purpose and in-
tended to compel the payment of money by the 
delinquent, by an order of indefinite imprison-
ment until the payment was made. To support 
such a judgment in contempt it is clear that it 
should first appear that the act sought to be 
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coerced was yet within the power of the person 
proceeded against to perform. It would be repug-
nant to reason and futile to order a person im-
prisoned until he did some particular thing, unless 
he had the present ability to do it.'' 
Section 104-45-10 Utah Code Annotated 1943 pro-
vides as follows : 
"Upon the answer and evidence taken the 
court or judge must determine whether the person 
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt 
charged, and if it is adjudged that he is guilty of 
the contempt, a fine may he imposed upon him 
not exceeding $200, or he may he imprisoned in 
the county jail not exceeding thirty days, or he 
may be both fined and imprisoned.'' 
It is evident that the court must exercise a discre-
tion as to the punishment to be imposed and, therefore, he 
has a right to inquire into the circumstances of the party. 
See also 48 C. J. 833, Perjury, paragraph 33: 
''A statement can be neither material nor 
immaterial in itself, but its materiality must be 
determined in accordance with its relation to 
some extraneous matter. False testimony rela-
tive to a non-existent issue cannot he material. 
But any statement which is relevant to the mat-
ter under investigation is sufficiently material to 
form the basis of a charge of perjury. The test of 
materiality is whether a false statement can in-
fluence the tribunal - not whether it doe's.'' 
48 C. J. 832, paragraph 32: 
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·'At conunon law and under statutes preserv-
ing the common law rule in this res:pect, a false 
statement must be material to the issue or ques-
tion under consideration in order to constitute 
perjury. Irrelevant testimony although false, can-
not be made the basis of a charge or perjury; nor 
will a false. oath as to superfluous and immater-
ial matter sustain an indictment for this offense. 
Under statutes changing the common law rule 
in this respect materiality is not an element of the 
crime of perjury. Citing: State vs. Miller 26 R.I. 
282, 58A. 882; State vs. Byrd, 28 S.C. 18, 4 SE 
793, 13 AJ.n. SR660; Reg vs. Ross, 1 Montr. ( Q.B.) 
Que 227. 
(a) 1n second degree perjury materiality is 
not necessary. State vs. Wilson 83 wash 419, 145 
P. 445.'' 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 
THE STATEMENTS INVOLVED WERE VOLUNTARILY 
MADE 
Appellant urges in his brief that the question of mar-
riage was incriminating and in vj olation of the protection 
afforded a witness under Article 1, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section 105-1-10 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
The proceedings before the Court, in which this 
charge arose, were civil in nature and in furtherance of 
civil process. It was proper and within the jurisdiction 
and power of the Court to summon the Appellant before 
him and with Byington present iri Court, question him 
concerning his failure to pay support money, attorney's 
fees, and generally abide by the Court's Decree. 
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Section 105-1-10, 1943, as cited by Appellant, is a 
section of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. It is of 
long standing in the common law system of jurisprudence 
as a protection for those accused of a crime. Byington 
was not accused. He was a participant in a civil proced-
ings. The Order to Appear and Show Caus·e was in the 
nature of proceedings supplementary to execution in 
civil matters. 
There is a distinction between criminal and civil 
Contempts. In 17 C.J.S. 7, the following appears: 
''A criminal contempt is conduct that is 
directed against the dignity and authority of the 
court, or a judge acting judicially; it is an act 
obstructing the administration of justice which 
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disres-
pect. 
Criminal contempt may arise in the course of 
a criminal action, in special proceedings, or in 
civil or priV'ate litigation. 
The line of demarcation between acts con-
stituting criminal and those constituting civil 
contempts is very indistinct. The confusion in 
attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts 
is due to the fact that there are contempts in 
which both elements appear. In general, con-
tempts of court for which punishm·ent is inflicted 
for the primary purpose of vindicating public 
authority are denominated criminal, while those 
in which the enforcement of civil rights and re-
medies is the ultimate object of the punishment 
are denominated civil con tempts; whether or not 
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a fine or inprisonment is imposed is not a dis-
tinguishing test. 
Civil Conten1pt consists in failing to do 
something· ordered to be done by a court in 
a civil action for the benefit of an opposing party 
therein, and is therefore, an offense against the 
party in whose behalf the violated order is made. 
If, however, the contempt consists in doing a for-
bidden act, injurious to the opposite party, the 
contempt may he considered criminal.'' 
This Court has held in the case of Foreman vs. Fore-
man,-Utah-176 Pac. (2d) 165 at 168 as follows: 
"\Ye believe that ~Ir. Justice Stone, in the 
case of Lamb vs. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, at page 
:220, 52 S. Ct. 315, at page 316, 76 L. Ed. 715, sets 
out clearly and concisely the rule ror determining 
the nature of such procedings. He said: 
• ***The fine or the incarceration ordered 
in conjunction with the relief afforded the 
litigant is considered secondary to the grant-
ing of that relief even though it has the effect 
of vindicating the authority of the Court. In 
each of these two cases, the party litigant 
who is the beneficiary of the Court's Order 
is interested in the result thereof, and in case 
of an appeal is interested in upholding the 
Court's Order in order to establish and/or 
satisfy his rights.' " 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Byington 
was neither before the court in the status of an accus·ed, 
nor compelled to incriminate or give evidence against 
himself. H,e did not stand charged with a crime. 
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Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides in part, ''The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; ***" and it 
is this provision of our Constitution under which the 
privilege against self-incrimination arises. 
As a filatter of fact, the honorable district Court in 
the proceedings. below, and this Court is not and should 
not be concerned with the nature of the testi~ony given, 
that is, whether or not it was privileged or improperly 
received as the fundamental issue is whether or not 
Byington perjured himself before the Court. 
The authorities, generally speaking, are not in ac-
cord :;:ts to the practice or procedure which should be 
followed either by the court, counsel or witnesses when 
an incriminating qu~stion is submitted for answer. Gen-
erally speaking experience has shown that the witness, 
to say the least, is in a rather perilous position. If he 
answers the question he may subject himself to prose-
cution. If he refuses to answer he may find himself 
guilty of direct contempt for his refusal, and if he coun-
sels with the Court he places himself in a degrading 
posiHon. His dilemma must depend upon the decision of 
the Court as to whether or not his answer would be in-
criminating. See Vol. 8, Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd 
Edition, Pg. 304, Paragraph 2251 et seq. 
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition Vol. 8, Page 
851 discusses the r.ule of law tothe effect it is not for 
the witness to determine if the question is incriminating 
and the great weight of authority holds that the court 
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must decide if a question is material or pertinent to the 
issue. These are held the prerogative of the inquisitor. 
~Ioreover, the privilege is ''an option of refusal and not 
a prohibition of inquiry.'' See vVigmore on Evidence, 
Vol. 8, page 389. This last mentioned rule has been dis-
cussed and adopted by this Court. In State vs. Thorne 
39 Utah 208,117 Pac. 58, it is stated: 
''The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that a 
defendant, in a criminal case, becoming a witness, 
may be cross-examined the same as any other 
witness. He, like any other witness, may be asked 
many questions wholly irrelevant. and collateral 
to the issue, for the purpose of testing his mem-
ory, affecting his credibility, and the weight of 
his tHstimony. When a question is asked which 
relates to incriminating acts, or calls for evidenc:e 
of an incriminating character, separate and dis-
tinct from those on trial or testified to by him, 
he, like any other witness, may claim the privilege 
and decline to answer it. The prevailing opinion 
in this country is that it is for the court, and not 
the witness to determine whether the evidence 
called for by th'e qustion propounded may or not 
tend to incriminate the witness.'' 
Bearing in mind the foregoing principJes of law, it is 
difficult to rationalize the position of the Appellant con-
cerning the propriety of the questions in the first in-
stance. All that was asked of the Appellant was whether 
or not he was married, and he promptly answered, ''yes.'' 
The Court then went on to ask when he had been married 
and, as submitted in Proposition 1 of this Brief, it is the 
position of the Respondent that such evidence would be 
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pertinent to the disposition of the case because, by knmY-
ing when the marriage took place, the Court would have 
some rule to determine how long he had been married. 
The Appellant would have a reviewer of this cause jump 
to the conclusion that when the questions were asked in 
the first instance the Court then had reason to believe 
such questions self-incriminating. Certainly such a con-
clusion cannot be gleaned from the record. To say the 
least, it does not imply immoralit:.T to ask a man if he is 
married, that he will defame himself by answering, or 
subject himself to punishment for a crime. 
Counsel cites authorities to the effect that the Court 
should warn the 'vitness and advise him of his privilege. 
Again there is no indication that the Court was aware of 
any necessity for so doing should such be the law. Bying-
ton perjured himself. Upon making the discovery of this 
possibility, the court gave him adequate time to recon-
sider the questions submitted, even to the extent of re-
questing that he produce his wife. In 41 American Juris-
prudence, page 8, it is stated: 
"A false statement made in Court under fear 
or compulsion constitutes perjury, since the im-
pelling danger is not present, imminent, impend-
ing or unavoidable.'' 
The Appellant now 'submits to this Court that Bying-
ton falsified before the Court be-cause he knew he would 
incriminate himself if he told the truth, and that any an-
swers made to these incriminating questions, as so called, 
were made in ignorance of constitutional privileges and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
as a consequence any privileg-e which he failed to exer-
cise could not be considered as waived. See 28 R.C.L. 
430, paragraph 16. 
The foregoing proposition submitted by the Appel-
lant would bear son1e weig-ht and consideration were 
Byington being charged with a crime as a result 
of the information received in the course of the proceed-
ings; that is, a crime concerning his marriage or failure 
to marry. Then, and in such instances, the question of 
waiver of privilege would be material. The issue before 
this Court is not the admissibility of information against 
the accused, but rather, whether or not having been sworn 
and placed under oath, he deliberately falsified. 
PROPOSITION NO. 3 
TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED 
According to the record, as set forth in the Appel-
lant's Brief, prior to the trial of this case, attorney for 
the Appellant filed application and petition for a change 
of judge. Upon the affidavit of the Appellant to the 
effect that the presiding judge, before whom the action 
was pending, was prejudiced against him and that the 
defendant believed said judge would not grant him a fair 
and impartial trial. 
It is respectfully submitted that this is the only 
indication of record that there was any doubt concern-
ing the ability of the Court to hear the matter fairly. The 
affidavit, which at the most states a conclusion of the 
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Appellant, is the only evidence that the Judge was either 
biased. or prejudiced. 
A review of the record and pages 3 to 15 of the tran-
script discloses that in the selection of the jury the court 
absolutely insured that the Defendant would be afforded 
a fair trial. Nowhere in the proceedings does it appear 
that this attitude changed during the course of the trial. 
This court has repeatedly held that the motion seeking 
to disqualify a trial judge on the ground of bias and 
prejudice is addressed to the discretion of the judge. He 
must decide the motion the same as any other matter 
which comes before him. 11 usser vs. Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, 106 Utah 373, 148 Pac. (2d) 802. An affi-
davit stating that the judge is biased and prejudiced 
does not. show disqualification. Cox vs. Dixie Packing 
Co., 72 Utah 236, 269 Pac. 1000. See also Haslam vs. Mor-
rison-Utah-190 Pac. (2d) 520 and Willie vs. Local 
Reality Co.-Utah (April 28, 1948). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the 
jury in this matter was based upon evidence which con-
clusively shows the guilt of the accused. Byington after 
disregarding an order of court, committed what may 
have been found to be a crime in living with another 
party ·without the sanction of a marriage ceremony. 
Then when questioned by the Court concerning apparent 
disobedience to his order, he .perjured himself. ·There-
after Byington attempts to gain a privilege by belately 
arguing that he would inncrimiate himself by answering 
truthfully. The judgment and conviction should he af-
firmed. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah 
ANDREW JOHN BR.ENNAN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys fior Plaimtiff and 
Respondent. 
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